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Abstract
In order to understand the extent of the information barrier to adoption of a household technology, we
designed a randomized controlled trial on willingness to pay (WTP) for solar lanterns in India. We gave
high quality solar lanterns to randomly selected ‘seed’ households in a non-electrified region of the state
of Uttar Pradesh. Three friends of the seed household were randomly assigned to one of the following
three groups: control, passive learning and incentivized communication. We elicit WTP from the control
group when the seed receives the solar lantern. We elicit WTP from the friends in the passive learning
and incentivized communication groups thirty days after the seed receives the solar lantern. We show
that passive learning increases WTP by 90% and incentivized communication by 145% relative to the
control group. We also show that learning from others is the mechanism that drives the observed WTP
by peers.
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1 Introduction
Economic growth theories portray technological progress as the engine of economic development and pros-
perity. The recent version of this theory uses endogenous growth models to highlight the important role
of social learning in technology diffusion (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Aghion and Howitt, 1997; Barro and
SalaiMartin, 2004; Acemoglu, 2009). Economic growth in this set-up is characterized as endogenously driven
through investment in human capital, knowledge and innovation. Profit maximizing firms invest, learn by
doing and learn from each other through knowledge spillovers; these processes induce smooth technological
diffusion in the economy. The theory was later applied to understand technological innovation and diffusion
in agriculture in developing countries (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Bandiera and
Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010). Using state-of-the-art empirical strategies, this strand of literature
identifies the role of social networks in promoting social learning, adoption and diffusion of new agricultural
technologies.
One feature of earlier studies on the role of social networks is the assumption of “passive learning”, a situ-
ation in which peers learn about new technologies from their peers without cost. However, in recent research,
BenYishay and Mobarak (2014) show that the power of social networks in diffusion of new technologies could
be enhanced by incentivizing information communication. In this paper, we attempt to shed light on the
role of incentivizing information communication by one’s network members or peers on willingness to pay
(WTP) for new technology using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) in India. Motivated by theories of
intra-household decision-making, we also investigate the role of gender in information communication and
willingness to pay for the new technology.
We collaborated with a local organization and distributed a new solar-powered lantern to households
in Gonda district, in the Uttar Pradesh state of India. The solar lanterns are durable, multipurpose, and
convenient to use. They sold for 1,200 rupees (USD 18.5) in Lucknow, the capital of Uttar Pradesh state at
the time of the fieldwork (Fall, 2015). Notably, the lanterns have a mobile-charging feature which allows the
user to charge a mobile phone. The study area is still non-electrified and households did not have knowledge
about the solar lanterns prior to the study. We randomly selected 200 “seed” individuals, half of them male
and half of them female, to whom we offered the solar lantern for participating in the study. Each seed
household gave three names of peers (friends or relatives), and these were randomly assigned into a “network
treatment”, a “communication treatment” and a “control group”. We elicited willingness to pay for the solar
lanterns from the control group immediately after interviewing the seed household, using the Becker-Degroot-
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Marschak (BDM) method (Becker, Degroot, and Marschak, 1964). In the network group, the subjects, who
were designated as friends by the seed, were interviewed 30 days after the seed received the solar lantern to
elicit their willingness to pay. We refer to the learning captured through this process as “passive learning”.
In the communication group, the 30-day delay was followed by a tea meeting at which the seed presented the
solar lantern and shared his or her experience with the friend, in return for a payment of 100 rupees (USD
1.54).1 We refer to the learning captured through this process as “incentivized communication”.
The results show that peers who very likely learned about the solar lantern through their relationship
with the seed household are on average willing to pay 120 rupees more than the control group a month after
the lanterns were distributed. Peers who were invited to a demonstration tea meeting by the seed households
a month after the lanterns were distributed, on the other hand, are willing to pay 190 rupees more than the
control group. With a mean WTP of 134 in the control group, the proportional treatment effects are 90%
and 145%, respectively. Both treatment effects appear to be large. It is notable that the passive learning
treatment effect almost doubled WTP, whereas incentivized communication added another 55 percentage
points increase in the treatment effect.
This paper is broadly related to a body of research in economics on the impact of peers on outcomes. This
strand of literature, focusing mostly on developed countries, investigates the impact of peers or friends on
several outcome variables of interest, including educational achievement (e.g., Hoxby, 2000; Sacerdote, 2001;
Angrist and Lang, 2002; Zimmerman, 2003; Figlio, 2005), market and health outcomes (e.g., Munshi, 2003;
Kling and Liebman, 2007), labor productivity and consumption (e.g., Mobius, Niehaus, and Rosenblat, 2005;
Mas and Moretti, 2009) and adoption of technology (Oster and Thornton, 2012). The extent of peer effects
has also been examined in the development economics literature, largely to explain agricultural technology
adoption (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Bardhan and Udry, 1999; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and
Udry, 2010). A particularly important observation in this literature is that modern agricultural technologies
significantly promote yield, but their adoption or uptake rate has been disappointingly low. These studies
show that, when farmers consider adopting new technologies, they are likely to trust recommendations from
their peers, friends, or members of their social network who have experienced the technology, rather than
from others external to their community.
BenYishay and Mobarak (2014) investigate social learning further by designing a randomized controlled
trial in rural Malawi to vary the method of dissemination of information about two agricultural technologies
that promote yield - pit planting and Chinese composting. These authors specifically investigate whether
1At the time of the survey, 1 USD = 65 rupees.
3
provision of performance-based rewards to those who communicate about the new technologies results in
increased diffusion of the technologies. Among the three types of information communicators they chose
- government-employed extension workers, lead farmers, and peer farmers - adoption of the technologies
by others was much more likely in response to the information provided by peer farmers. Our paper adds
to this literature by disentangling the magnitudes of “passive learning”, i.e., learning from others without
cost, and “incentivized communication”, i.e., learning from others through improved quality of information,
on willingness to adopt and pay for the new technology. Unlike agricultural technologies which involve
uncertainty and take time to capture their payoff, the solar lantern we consider is easy to use and multi-
purpose, and it is easy to assess its payoffs with greater certainty in a short time. Our design also allows us
to aggregate revealed WTP, a figure important for policymakers and other stakeholders to design optimal
subsidy and cost reduction strategies to encourage diffusion of the technology in cases when average WTP
is lower than average cost.
The major challenge in identifying the impact of peers on adoption of new technologies, even after
tackling endogeneity through a randomized assignment, is understanding the mechanisms that drive the
observed results. It may be that peers imitate each other rather than learning from each other about the
benefits of the new technology or learning how to operate the technology (Oster and Thornton, 2012). In
order to shed light on the possible mechanisms, we collected detailed information on familiarity with solar
lanterns, perception about their benefit, estimated market value, etc. As expected, we find that both the
network and the communication groups are likely to have seen a solar lantern before the date of the WTP
experiment, and they are much more likely to know someone who owns a lantern, compared to the control
group. We also find that, compared to the control group, subjects in both treatment groups believe that the
solar lantern needs proper maintenance in order to function properly and they estimate its market price to
be higher. We also observe that subjects initially don’t think solar lanterns are worth more than kerosene
lamps, which are the most common sources of lighting in the study area. However, as they see a friend
taking care of the solar panel through which the lantern is powered, the power of the light coming out the
lantern, and the mobile phone charging function, they estimate the market price of the lantern to be higher.
Consequently they are willing to pay more for the lantern. These results suggest that learning both how
to operate the technology and the benefits provided by the technology drive the high WTP the treatment
groups reveal, notably to a larger extent that of the communications group’s.
The paper also speaks to the emerging literature on electrification in developing countries (Dinkelman,
2011; Dugoua and Urpelainen, 2014; Furukawa, 2014; Grimm et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2016; Lee, Miguel, and
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Wolfram, 2016), an area of research that overlaps with development and energy economics. The current level
of electrification in developing regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America remains
low (International Energy Agency, 2014). Extending the grid to the most rural regions requires high levels of
investment that are often difficult to secure by governments. Solar power serves as a decentralized solution
to the problem of energy poverty, and is slowly diffusing throughout rural Africa and rural South Asia
(Sandwell, Wheeler, and Nelson, 2017). However, tight household budget constraints, poor product quality
and little local expertise in photovoltaic technologies have been hindering faster adoption.2 In addition,
given the increased need to reduce greenhouse gas emission from the energy sector, exploring the role of
solar-powered lighting equipment, which emits no greenhouse gas would have large benefits to society at
large. From a public policy point of view, the findings from this paper will provide useful information on
willingness to uptake such technologies and the factors that drive their quick diffusion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship of the current paper to
existing literature. Section 3 lays out our key hypotheses about willingness to pay for solar lanterns. Section
4 describes the design and procedure of the randomized controlled trial, with results of the randomization
checks. Section 5 presents the key empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Relationship to Existing Literature
This paper contributes to a large and growing literature on the role of peers - co-workers, friends and
acquaintances - on behavior and outcomes that builds off the work of Sacerdote (2001), Hoxby (2000), Munshi
(2003), and Mobius, Niehaus, and Rosenblat (2005). Friends and members of social networks influence
one’s beliefs and consequently decisions. These studies, almost exclusively focused in developed countries,
document the impact of peers on one’s educational achievements, labor productivity, and consumption
behavior. Roommates affect one’s freshman GPA and the decision to join social organizations, and classmates
influence reading scores in elementary schools in the United States (Sacerdote, 2001; Hoxby, 2000). Peers
and networks members help Mexican migrants in the United States find higher-paying jobs (Munshi, 2003)
and have as large an effect as advertising on consumer demand (Mobius, Niehaus, and Rosenblat, 2005).
Other studies in similar settings (e.g., Zimmerman, 2003; Angrist and Lang, 2002; Figlio, 2005; Kling and
Liebman, 2007; Mas and Moretti, 2009) further document the role of peers in influencing one’s behavior and
decisions.
There are studies (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010)
2See Karakaya and Sriwannawit (2015) for a recent systematic review of the literature on barriers to the adoption of
photovoltaic technologies in developing countries.
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investigating the role of peers in social networks in adoption and diffusion of productivity-enhancing modern
agricultural technologies in developing countries. These studies were mainly motivated by the fact that
modern agricultural technologies significantly promote yield and improve welfare, but their adoption and
diffusion rates have been sub-optimally slow. Adoption of a new agricultural technology by a farmer is a
social process because it generates knowledge to all her peers and increases their expected yield (Bardhan
and Udry, 1999). This strand of literature implies that farmers in developing countries are likely to trust
recommendations by fellow farmers more than by those from other people external to their community. In
view of this, social networks play a significant role in diffusion of new technologies. Outside an agricultural
set-up, more recently Oster and Thornton (2012) investigate the role of peer effects in adoption of menstrual
cups by school girls in Nepal and document a strong effect on learning how to use the technology.
There are methodological challenges in identifying the impact of social networks on technology adoption
using observational data. First, when two friends are both adopting a certain technology, it is difficult to
distinguish whether it is because the two friends learn from each other or because individuals who are open
to trying out a new technology also have friends with similar characteristics that are unobservable (Manski,
1993). Second, it is difficult to precisely define the social network of an adopter of a new technology and
even so, it may be that individuals are just imitating each other rather than learning from each other
(Conley and Udry, 2010). Recent studies used the method of randomization to tackle these identification
problems (Sacerdote, 2001; Kremer and Levy, 2008; Rao, Mobius, and Rosenblat, 2007; Duflo and Saez, 2003;
Godlonton and Thornton, 2012; Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson, 2011; Kremer and
Miguel, 2007; Oster and Thornton, 2012).
A key feature of previous studies on the role of peers on adoption of new technologies (Bandiera and
Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010; Oster and Thornton, 2012) is the implicit assumption of learning from
peers without a cost, i.e., “passive learning” (BenYishay and Mobarak, 2014). New technologies could be
adopted and diffused faster if peers who communicate information about the new technology are rewarded.
This is the key argument by BenYishay and Mobarak (2014) who design a randomized controlled trial to
vary the method of dissemination for two agricultural technologies - pit planting and Chinese composting -
which are believed to improve maize yield in rural Malawi. These authors confirm the importance of social
networks in diffusion of agricultural technologies, but argue that their power can be significantly improved by
remunerating the peer who adopts the technology and makes a conscious effort to communicate and convince
other farmers.
Our paper contributes to this literature in three main ways. First, this paper is the first to examine the
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impact of rewarding communication about a new technology on willingness to pay - as opposed to a binary
measure of adoption. We clearly identify the impact and magnitude on WTP of both passive networks and
incentivized communication by peers about a new solar lantern technology, using a randomized controlled
trial. This distinction is important because estimating average willingness to pay allows policymakers to
estimate whether new technologies could be distributed profitably and the amount of resources required to
speed up adoption and diffusion in case revealed WTP is lower than the cost of the new technology. Second,
unlike agricultural technologies, which take time to observe their benefit and involve substantial uncertainty,
solar lanterns are easy technologies to learn about in a short period of time. As a result, biophysical and
climatic factors, which seem to differ markedly even between closely located farms, would not be confounded
with the decision to adopt and WTP for the technology. Third, we consider a technology which is not only
quick to learn about, but also has a significant welfare effect on all members of households. The current rate
of electrification in developing regions of the world is very low and households very often use kerosene lamps
for lighting. Kerosene lamps have been documented to generate indoor air pollution and adversely affect
health outcomes of members, pose a risk of burns and fires, emit hazardous greenhouse gases, and require
rural households to regularly travel long distance to buy kerosene (Lam et al., 2012). The solar lanterns that
we randomly distributed are, among other things, multi-purpose, affordable, and reasonably-priced, with a
significant potential to enhance health outcomes of all household members, reduce greenhouse gas emissions
and help children allocate more time to studying.
3 Conceptual Framework
Drawing on Foster and Rosenzweig (1995); Bardhan and Udry (1999); Bandiera and Rasul (2006); Conley and
Udry (2010); BenYishay and Mobarak (2014), we now lay out a brief motivating framework for interpreting
the main results. We begin by defining the following treatments:
• In the network treatment group, subjects observe the use of a new technology by others without
incentivized communication. Thus, learning from others is passive.
• In the communication treatment group, subjects both observe the use of new technology by others and
receive direct communication about the properties of the new technology just before WTP is elicited.
Thus, learning from others is considered to be ‘active’.
To test the presence of social learning – that is, learning from others – in agriculture, these studies make
use of the “target-input” model proposed by Wilson (1975) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1994). According to
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this model, the farmer knows the basic form of the new technology (e.g., an improved seed) with certainty,
but does not know the target level, which is assumed to be random. Farm profit is inversely related to the
difference between the actual level of input applied and the target level. The farmer realizes what the actual
level of input should have been only after the input has been applied and output has been realized. As a
result, the farmer learns about the new technology over time through learning-by-doing.
In the target-input model, individuals can also learn from each other’s experience when they share
similar distribution of the input target. Assume that two farmers belong to a certain social network and
share information with each other or costlessly observe each other’s input choice. In each period, farmers use
Bayes’ rule to update their prior belief on the variance of the optimal input level, making use of information
from their own experience and the experience of their network members. Thus, adoption of a new technology
in this model is a social process because its adoption by an individual generates information spillover to all
her peers, which increases their expected welfare in the future (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). Diffusion of
solar lanterns can be modelled using the social learning framework because peers of seed households observe
(without any cost) the service provided by the lanterns and immediately update their belief about the quality
of the lanterns. Consequently, these individuals would be willing to pay more than those who did not have
prior information about the lanterns.
Hypothesis 1. The network treatment increases willingness to pay.
An important extension of the ‘target-input”model by BenYishay and Mobarak (2014) is that the member
of the social network who communicates information about the new technology, i.e., the “communicator”
knows the optimal level of the technology. However, it would be costly to transfer her knowledge about the
new technology to other farmers. If there is an intervention that rewards the information communicator
based on what proportion of farmers adopted the new technology as a result of the communicator’s efforts,
diffusion of the technology may occur much faster. Such incentives induce the communicator to make a
conscious effort and bear the cost of communication and transmitting information about the new technology
to others (BenYishay and Mobarak, 2014). As a result, others will learn about the new technology and adopt
it much more quickly than the case of unincentivized communication through ordinary social networks. In
our case, rewarding seed households to invite one of their randomly selected peers for a tea meeting after
the seed household used the solar lanterns for a month is expected to result in transmission of more accurate
information. As a result, peers who have been provided detailed information about the attributes of the
solar lanterns in such a way are likely to pay more for the lanterns than peers who were not invited for the
tea meeting (the network treatment group).
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Hypothesis 2. The communication treatment increases willingness to pay more than the network treatment.
Another aim of our RCT is testing the role of gender in communication about a new technology. Early
studies (Chiappori, 1992; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Chiappori, Fortin, and Lacroix, 2002; Bourguignon,
Browning, and Chiappori, 2009) from industrialized countries show that, although members of a household
(most importantly, couples) often have different preferences and intra-household bargaining power, they still
achieve Pareto-efficient outcomes in household decision-making. However, studies in developing countries
document rejection of Pareto-efficiency in household decision-making, most importantly because of differences
in preferences and intra-household bargaining power between husbands and wives. Udry (1996) documents
that total yield by farm households in Burkina Faso could be improved by relocating inputs from male-
cultivated plots to female-cultivated plots.3 Schaner (2015) provides evidence indicating that households in
Kenya make sub-optimal saving decisions as a result of differences in discount rates of couples. More recent
studies (Miller and Mobarak, 2013; Alem, Hassen, and Ko¨hlin, 2017) show that improved cookstoves, which
enhance the quality of life of all household members, are valued at significantly higher levels by women than
men, but could not be adopted optimally because women have low decision-making power (autonomy).
Drawing on these studies, we test the hypothesis that female social networks are less effective in promoting
technology adoption. If female members of a household have less bargaining power than male members, then
female social networks, compared to male social networks, are channels of information transmission that
focus on a less-influential decision-maker. Because the female member who learns information through her
social network lacks the autonomy to make the purchase, we expect the information to be less relevant
than in the case of male social networks. Thus, when either passive learning or incentivized communication
occurs through female networks, women’s lack of decision-making power impedes learning by the relevant
decision-maker, and thus the effect of the treatment on WTP in the household should be of lesser magnitude.
Hypothesis 3. Learning through male social networks increases willingness to pay by a greater amount than
learning through female social networks.
4 Experimental Design
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a WTP experiment in 200 unelectrified habitations of Gonda district
in the state of Uttar Pradesh, India.4 Habitations (also called sub-villages or hamlets) are the lowest
3A related study, Robinson (2012), documents that the response in private consumption to an exogenous shock is significantly
different between wives and husbands in western Kenya, implying that informal risk-sharing mechanisms within households are
not Pareto-efficient.
4Before implementation, the experiment was reviewed and approved by the internal review board (IRB) of Columbia Uni-
versity.
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administrative units in India. The subjects were given an opportunity to purchase a solar lantern in a BDM
game. We compared the effects of a network treatment and a communication treatment using randomly
assigned male and female contacts. The experiment was conducted in two rounds between the end of July
and the beginning of October 2015. The study area was chosen because it had a low electricity access rate,
with many unelectrified habitations close to Gonda City, the district capital. To avoid data mining and bias
from multiple comparisons, a detailed pre-analysis plan (PAP) listing all research hypotheses and our key
empirical specifications was registered with Evidence in the Governance and Politics website.5
The primary specification equation can be written as follows:
WTPij = α+ β1Ni + β2NiFi + γ1NiCi + γ2NiCiFi + µj + ij , (1)
where WTPi is the willingness to pay for a solar lantern by household i within habitation j; Ni is a
dummy variable coding for whether household i knows a lantern user through its social network (either
through the social network of the head or that of the spouse); Fi is a dummy variable coding for whether the
lantern user is known through the social network of the female spouse; Ci is a dummy variable coding for
whether the household engaged in active communication with the lantern user of his network; µj is a vector
of habitation fixed effects (N = 200); ij is a random error term. Our objective is to estimate β1, β2, γ1, γ2.
Throughout, we cluster standard errors by habitations. In this empirical framework, the hypotheses can be
expressed as follows. Hypothesis 1 is equivalent to β1 > 0 and β1 + β2 > 0; Hypothesis 2 to γ1 > 0 and
γ1 + γ2 > 0; Hypothesis 3 to β2 < 0 and γ2 < 0.
4.1 Outcome Variable
In the experiment, subjects were given the opportunity to purchase a solar lantern. Photos of the lantern
can be found in the appendix. At the time of the experiment, the retail price of the lantern was 1,200 rupees
(USD 18.5). The product features included a 3-watt solar panel, a 6V 4.5Ah battery, a 3-watt, 24-piece
surface-mounted-device LED, and a mobile charging socket. We chose the product based on a review of
solar lanterns available among Uttar Pradesh distributors. We confirmed the performance of the lanterns -
in terms of the quality and duration of the lighting, and the charging power - by using them with the survey
team for about a week.
The outcome variable is the subject’s WTP measured in the BDM game. As Becker, Degroot, and
Marschak (1964) show, the BDM game recovers the subject’s true preference by removing incentives to
5The PAP is publicly available at http://egap.org/registration/1420.
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misrepresent WTP for strategic reasons. In the game, the subject is requested to provide his or her highest
WTP for an item, and the price of the item is then drawn from a random distribution. If the price is below
the stated WTP, the subject pays the randomly drawn price, not the stated WTP. Therefore, the subject
has no incentive to understate WTP to obtain a better bargain. This method has been widely applied in
development economics to measure WTP (e.g., Hoffmann, 2009; Levine et al., 2012; Guiteras et al., 2013)
because it is incentive-compatible and provides a continuous demand curve, as opposed to demand estimates
for a discrete number of price points (as is the case in a typical randomized-price WTP measurement).
The game was played in the field as follows. Each household is requested to announce their maximal
willingness to pay on a 0-1,200 rupee scale, and the actual price is determined by a random draw from a bag
which contains 21 balls, each one of them with a number written on it. The number goes from 0 to 1,200
rupees in increments of 100 rupees. The respondent first makes a bid and then randomly draws a ball. If
the price on the ball the respondent draws is higher than the bid, the respondent is not allowed to purchase
the lantern. If the price on the ball is lower than the bid, the respondent must purchase the lantern at the
price that was drawn. As a result, when the respondent makes a bid, he must make sure he has access to
the funds. The respondent has only one chance to play, and he cannot change his bid after drawing a ball.
Before the respondent played for ‘real’, the game was played with a bar of soap to make sure the respondent
fully understood the rules.
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the bids: we see that most subjects made a positive bid, but no
subject offered the non-subsidized market price of the lantern. We also note that the willingness to pay
displays important variation across individuals, spanning from 0 to 1200, with mean 239 and standard
deviation 266.
[Figure 1 about here.]
In measuring WTP, we paid particular attention to training the enumerators so that they explained
the procedure to the subjects carefully enough and always conducted the practice round with soap. Based
on our observation of the WTP measurement, the subjects understood the rules of the game. No subject
complained afterwards or refused to pay in case she or he won the solar lantern. The subjects were sometimes
disappointed if they did not win the lantern, but in that case they also did not have to give any money.
4.2 Sampling and Treatments
The data collection began with a mapping of 200 primary habitations and 25 replacement habitations around
Gonda City. The enumerators approached the habitations in expanding circles, with habitations near Gonda
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City visited first and those further away visited later. If a habitation was excluded because of safety concerns
or because it had access to grid electricity, a randomly drawn replacement habitation was used instead.
Overall, we had to exclude and replace five habitations. The map of the study area and habitations is shown
in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Within each habitation, the enumerators approached a randomly chosen “seed” household and, depending
on the treatment, interviewed either an adult male or female member. The seed was requested to provide
names of three friends with whom he or she interacts on a regular basis, and the three friends were then
randomly assigned to three groups: control, network, and communication. The control group was interviewed
on the same day and the network and communication groups approximately 30 days after the initial interview.
If the chosen friend was not the household head, we interviewed the head of the household to which that
friend belongs. Households in the three groups were offered the possibility of buying a solar lantern through
a BDM game.
The timeline of the experiment is summarized in Figure 3. The experiment began with sampling and the
interviews of the control group in July-August 2015. In each habitation, the network and communication
groups were interviewed approximately one month after sampling. We surveyed the network group at the
same time as the communication group to avoid treatment spillovers. Table 1 summarizes the size of the
different treatment groups. We visited a total of 197 habitations, 98 assigned to the male seed treatment and
99 to the female seed treatment. Three habitations were dropped because the network and communications
friends were no longer living in the surroundings, and hence could not be surveyed.
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Table 1 about here.]
The male-female treatment was randomized at the habitation level. One of the researchers drew a
random number for each habitation and assigned the highest 100 numbers to the female treatment. All seed
households were given a free solar lantern in exchange for taking part in the survey. They were also paid
100 rupees conditional on inviting one of the three friends for a tea meeting to introduce the solar lanterns
and discuss their user experience. Our survey team, consisting of enumerators who speak the local dialect,
attended all tea meetings. They specifically told the seed households that their goal was not to convince
their friend to buy a lantern but only to share stories about their experience and the performance of the
lanterns.
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Within each habitation, the three friends named by the seed were randomly assigned to the control or to
the network or communication treatment. The household of the friend in the control group was visited and
asked for WTP immediately after the seed household provided the name of three friends. The procedure for
the households of those in the network and communication groups was similar, except for the two following
differences. First, the visit to the network and communication households took place about a month later.
A one-month lag is a way to ensure that knowledge about the lantern can naturally diffuse from the seed
household to peer households. Second, before playing the BDM game with the communication household,
the seed invited his/her communication friend over to discuss his/her experience of the lantern.
4.3 Covariate Balance and Power Analysis
The balance table for the information treatment is shown in Table 2. As the table shows, the treatment
groups are balanced across most covariates, with a few exceptions: gender of the respondent, savings and
indebtedness. The control group has significantly more female heads of household and about 450 rupees
less in savings compared to the network and communication groups. This is a potential source for concern
given households with more savings would be in a better position to bid higher prices. For this reason, as a
robustness check, we include these variables in additional regression analysis.
[Table 2 about here.]
The balance table across the seed gender treatments is shown in Table 3. As could be expected, within
each information treatment group the households referred by the female seeds are more likely to be headed
by a female, while the households referred by the male seeds are usually headed by a male. It follows that
the different groups display significant differences for variables such as education, consumption expenses or
literacy.
[Table 3 about here.]
Standard power analysis shows that the experiment can identify plausible treatment effects. Using the
control group’s mean and standard deviation (134 and 181 respectively), a standard deviation’s uniform
increase (to 315, with a standard deviation of 362) would be detected with an α = 0.95 probability if the
control and treatment group each had at least 65 participants. In our setting, each group has 200 subjects,
and, we cluster standard errors at the habitation level (N = 200). We also control for habitation fixed effects,
which enables us to estimate the treatment effects more precisely.
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5 Results
5.1 Main Estimates
Figure 4 shows the distribution of bids across treatment groups. There is a noticeable change in the distri-
bution between the control group and the network group, and between the network group and the commu-
nication group: the distribution becomes flatter and displays a much fatter left tail. This likely indicates
that our treatments have positive effects on WTP. We hardly notice important differences, however, when
comparing the distribution across gender of the seed; this indicates that our gender treatment is not likely
to have any effect.
We display box plots of WTP for the different treatment groups in Figure 5. We also show the value of
the mean WTP across treatments in Table 4. Formal test results on whether or not the differences between
these various means are significant are reported in Table 5 and Table 66. We find that the mean WTP in
the network and communication treatments is significantly higher than in the control. Table 5 reveals that
there is also a significant difference between the network and communication treatments when the sample
is not split by gender. However, when looking only at the sample with female seeds, there is no significant
difference between the means of the network and communication treatments. Finally, box plots on Figure 5
seem to indicate that there is a difference between Male and Female in the control group, but less so in the
treatment groups. This is confirmed in Table 6: the difference in the control group is significant at the 5%.
However, we note that the difference is not significant any longer when using the rank-sum test.
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Figure 5 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
[Table 6 about here.]
Mean comparisons, however, do not control for unobserved heterogeneity across habitations and for
correlation between observations within the same habitation. We therefore proceed to using regression
analysis with fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the habitation level. The main results from
regression analysis are shown in Table 7. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered at the habitation
6We performed both t-tests and rank-sum tests.
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level. Habitation fixed effects are not included in the second column because the gender treatment was
randomized across habitations. Results show that the network treatment increased WTP by almost 120
Rupees compared to the control group. Given the mean WTP of the control group was 134 Rupees,7 this
corresponds to a 90% increase. Furthermore, compared to the control group, the communication treatment
increased WTP by 195 Rupees which corresponds to a 145% increase. The gender treatment, however, does
not appear to have a statistically significant effect. The inclusion of habitation fixed effects in column 4
further reduces the coefficient for the interaction of the gender treatment with the information treatment in
the negative values.
[Table 7 about here.]
5.2 Robustness Checks
In Table 8, we include controls for monthly savings, one of the imbalanced covariates. We see that the
treatment effects coefficients slightly decrease from 120 to 108 Rupees in the network group and from 195 to
184 Rupees in the communication group. Yet, the effects remain robust. The coefficient for monthly savings
is significant at the 5% level but the magnitude is small: every additional Rupee in savings correlates with a
WTP increase of 0.026 Rupees. Given the imbalance of savings across treatment groups, this represents an
average contribution to the WTP of about 6 Rupees in the control group and 17 to 18 Rupees in the network
and communication groups. The contribution of savings to the WTP is therefore an order of magnitude
lower than the contribution of our information treatments. In fact, the raw correlation coefficient between
WTP and savings is only 0.15. This can be visualized on the scatter plot of WTP for the entire sample,
with amount of savings shown in the Appendix: those who had the highest amount of savings are not those
who bid the highest WTP. In regression 2, we interact monthly savings with the treatment dummies. The
coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant at the 10% level, indicating that savings and
WTP correlate even in this treatment group. We also re-run the regression using monthly savings in logs
instead of levels and find similar results. Specifically, we note that the estimated treatment effects decreases
slightly, from 120 to 103 Rupees in the network group and from 195 to 177 Rupees in the communication
group, but, overall, the effects remain large and significant at the 1% level. Finally, regression 5 estimates
the treatment effects for the sub-sample of respondents who declared having zero savings. This regression
therefore includes only about half of the observations. We see that the treatment effects found within this
subsample are very similar to those found for the whole sample. This confirms that monthly savings are not
7Similarly, the value of the intercept in model 1 of Table 7 is 134.5 Rupees.
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the main driver of our treatment effects.
[Table 8 about here.]
In Table 9, we add other control variables. In column 1, we control for whether the household head
is female because this was the other unbalanced variable. Treatment effects for both the network and
communication groups change little. In column 2, we control for both whether the household head is female
and for the amount of monthly savings. The main treatment effects are slightly reduced but remain large and
significant at the 1% level. In column 3, we control for the date when the household was surveyed. Harvesting
of maize and rice in the study area started at the end of September and early October respectively. This
timing partly coincided with our survey of the network and communication groups: about 20% of our treated
households were interviewed after September 258. If those sampled households began selling their harvest,
they would likely have been able to afford greater expenditures, and consequently have a higher WTP for
the solar lanterns. We therefore investigate the robustness of our treatment effect to this possible “wealth
effect”.
In order to investigate the possible role of a wealth effect, we control in our regression for the date of
interview. Specifically, the variable “Date” is the month and day of the month on which the respondent was
interviewed. If there is a wealth effect due to the sale of crops, respondents interviewed toward the end of
the experiment are more likely to have access to cash and bid a higher price. The coefficient on ‘Date’ then
should be positive. Results show that the coefficient is not significant and leans toward negative values.9 This
shows that respondents interviewed last were no more likely to bid higher amounts, which provides supporting
evidence against a wealth effect from the harvest season. In column 4, our main results remain robust to the
inclusion of seven additional control variables. Most variables, such as the level of education, expenditures,
whether or not the respondent is in debt, and household size, display small and insignificant coefficients. The
number of children going to school shows a slightly larger coefficient; the variable is statistically insignificant.
Only the number of kerosene lamps displays a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level: households
owning many kerosene lamps also bid slightly higher WTP. Intuitively, households with a greater number of
8Rice Knowledge Management Portal, maintained by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research
(http://www.rkmp.co.in/content/rice-growing-seasons-of-uttar-pradesh) indicates that in Uttar Pradesh summer
rice is harvested in April-May and Kharif rice in November-December. On the other hand, wheat is har-
vested around March-April in the eastern part of Uttar Pradesh, and around mid-April in the western part (see
http://www.archive.india.gov.in/citizen/agriculture/index.php?id=11). Our local team, however, indicated that a rea-
sonable estimate for the first day of harvest in the region around Gonda City was September 25 for Maize and October 5 for
rice, and we use these more conservative dates for our robustness check.
9Standard errors and coefficients are very large in this case due to the collinearity between our treatment dummies and the
date variable.
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kerosene lamps are likely to be households with a greater need for lighting products, which should translate
into higher WTP.
[Table 9 about here.]
5.3 Mechanisms
In this section, we investigate the possible mechanisms to explain why our treatments are effective. Table 10
displays the mean response to various survey questions for each treatment group. The exact phrasing of the
questions can be found in the appendix. We note that, compared to the control group, respondents in the
network and communication groups are much more likely to have seen a solar lantern before and they are
much more likely to know someone who owns a lantern. This is fully consistent with our experimental design
and provides evidence that our treatments were properly implemented. Furthermore, close to 90% of the
respondents in the network and communication group stated that they had conversations with that person
more than three times a week. Hence, the major factor explaining the difference between the network and
the communication groups is unlikely to be the level of interactions with a friend who owns a solar lantern.
The third and fourth variables in the table provide some insights as to why WTP has increased. Contrary
to the control group, most people in the network and communication groups now believe that, to function
properly, a solar lantern needs proper maintenance. They also estimate the cost of such a product at a
higher level than the control group. This indicates that a key lesson learned from their friend’s experience
relates to the technical quality of the lantern. At first, villagers might expect that solar lanterns are nothing
more sophisticated than kerosene lanterns. They then observe their friend taking care of it; they note the
photovoltaic panel that is connected to the lamp, which allows the battery to be charged. As a result, they
perceive the product as a sophisticated item that requires careful maintenance and are therefore willing to
pay a higher price. Interestingly, we note that respondents perceive solar lanterns positively. Almost everyone
answered “Definitely” to the questions of whether the lantern was innovative, whether it was superior to a
kerosene lamp, and whether they would recommend it to a friend over a kerosene lamp. This is despite
the fact that most of those in the control group confirm they had never seen a solar lantern before and did
not know anybody who owned one. It is also despite the fact that most people in the treated groups now
recognize that a solar lantern can not function without proper maintenance.
[Table 10 about here.]
In one of the survey questions, we asked respondents how much they thought the lantern cost. The mean
estimate approximates 730 Rupees with a standard deviation of about 500. Interestingly, the correlation
17
between cost estimates and the willingness to pay is small in magnitude. Regression 1 in Table 11 shows
that every 100 extra Rupees in cost estimate correlates with an increase in willingness to pay of only about 8
Rupees. In column 2 of the same table, we investigate the treatment effects on the estimated cost. We note
that both the network and communication groups display higher estimated costs compared to the control
group. In particular, respondents in the network group estimated the lantern at a higher cost than did
respondents in the communication group. Yet, they bid lower prices in the BDM game on average. This
indicates that the main mechanism through which the tea meetings affect willingness to pay is not through
increasing respondents’ perception of the product’s cost. It is rather through improving knowledge about
the attributes of the solar lantern technology.
[Table 11 about here.]
5.4 Why Didn’t Gender Affect Willingness to Pay?
In order to shed light on why gender did not affect WTP, we present the covariates of the friends chosen
by the male and female seeds, including formal statistical tests of differences in Table 12. Consistent with
existing gender inequalities in India, we observe that female seeds are less likely to be educated and literate.
We also note that female seeds have a weaker connection to the village’s social life: not only are they less
likely to participate in village meetings or religious and political events, but have also somewhat less trust
in other villagers, and say that they have fewer friends and spend less time with these friends, compared to
male seeds. Notably, they are much more likely to be born outside the village, which might play a role in
explaining these findings. One question in the survey asked seeds who they thought would mostly be using
the lanterns. It is interesting to see that 70% of female seeds declared that they would be the one using the
lantern. Furthermore, 30% of male seeds answered that their spouse would mostly use the product. Hence
it appears that both genders agree that the lantern is a product useful to women.
[Table 12 about here.]
Given these important differences between the two seed groups, we can expect that they choose friends
who are different in several characteristics. Table 13 reports characteristics of the household heads of the
female seeds’ friends and the male seeds’ friends. We observe that household heads in the female seed group
are less likely to be educated and literate, and have fewer savings. But, very importantly, we note that they
are also more likely to be female. In other words, female seeds are more likely to choose a friend who is
herself the head of her household, and it is likely that the differences in education, literacy and savings follow
from that fact.
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[Table 13 about here.]
Our hypothesis about the gender treatment relies on the assumption that a male household head discounts
information carried through a female network. Here, the sample of friends named by the female seeds are
in fact composed of a greater number of female household heads. These respondents, being female, are less
likely to discount information received through their direct social network. As a result, it is possible that
the absence of a treatment effect results from such a composition effect. To investigate this further, we test
the sensitivity of our results by dividing the sample according to the gender of the household head. Table
14 displays summary statistics for the two subsamples. We note that, overall, female household heads are
younger, have more children, are less educated and less likely to be literate, have less savings, and are less
likely to own a business. In Table 15, we run our main specification for the whole sample, the sub-sample of
male household heads, and the sub-sample of female household heads. It is more difficult to precisely estimate
the treatment effects for the female sub-sample because of the lower number of observations. However, we
note that the effects of the network and communication treatments are comparable in both sub-samples.
Regressions in columns 4, 5 and 6 investigate the effect of the gender treatment in each sub-sample separately.
We note that in the male sub-sample (column 5), our gender treatment still has little effect. This excludes
the possibility that the absence of a strong effect of the gender treatment results from a composition effect.
Instead, it indicates that the mechanism we hypothesised and discussed earlier might not be in place.
[Table 14 about here.]
[Table 15 about here.]
In an attempt to explain why men did not discount female seeds in our setting, Table 16 looks at indicators
of women’s status. Our survey included a series of questions about gender norms in the villages. In the
first set of questions, we asked respondents whether they believed a woman should ask permission from her
husband or a family member before going out. Almost all household heads said that women should ask for
permission to go to the health center, to visit a friend or to go to the market. On the other hand, answers
to other questions reflect more egalitarian views. Only about 5% of the sample said that they never talked
with their spouse about what to spend income on, and about two-thirds of the sample said they often had
such discussions. In addition, virtually all households thought that women should have a say in how income
is spent. Most respondents thought that it was definitively important that girls go to school. They further
expressed the view that beating a woman was rarely justified. Finally, most respondents thought that women
were as able as men to use new technologies. It appears that gender norms here give women some say in
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purchasing decisions, as well as when it comes to using new products. This might therefore explain why our
gender treatment had little effect on willingness to pay.
[Table 16 about here.]
6 Conclusion
Adoption and diffusion of new technologies is crucial to improve the livelihood of poor communities. One im-
portant factor that promotes this process is information sharing through social networks. Adoption of a new
technology is a social process because its adoption by an individual creates positive information externality
to peers and this increases their expected welfare (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). Does rewarding individuals
who make a conscious effort to communicate information about new technologies increase willingness to
pay (WTP) by members of a social network? Whose social network in the household matters for the flow
of information about new technologies? In this paper, we attempted to answer these questions by craft-
ing a randomized controlled trial which involves distribution of multi-purpose solar lanterns under different
treatments.
We collaborated with a local institution in rural India and assigned three peers of randomly recruited seed
individuals (half of them male and half female) into a “network treatment”, a “communication treatment”
and a “control group”. We elicited WTP for the solar lanterns from the control group right after interviewing
the seed household, using the Becker-Degroot-Marschak (BDM) method (Becker, Degroot, and Marschak,
1964). We elicited WTP for the lanterns from the “network” group one month after the seed households
had acquired the lantern. We also asked the seed households to invite one of the peers (the communication
group) for a tea meeting to demonstrate and share their experience in using the lantern after a month, in
return for an incentive payment of 100 rupees. We elicited WTP of the communication group after the tea
meetings have taken place. The study area is non-electrified and households did not have previous knowledge
about the solar lanterns. These facts allowed us to explore the flow of information and the value households
place on technologies that have large potential to improve quality of life of all members of the household.
Our results show that households, who most likely learned about the solar lantern technology through
their network (passive network), are willing to pay 120 Rupees more compared to the control group. Given
the control group is willing to pay 134 Rupees on average, this corresponds to a 90% increase in WTP. On the
other hand, households who attended a demonstration session by their peers (the communication treatment)
are willing to pay 195 Rupees (145%) more than the control group. We do not find a statistically significant
difference in WTP between male and female networks in either treatment. In order to shed light on the
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possible mechanisms that explain the observed outcome (WTP for the solar lanterns), we collected detailed
information on peers’ previous knowledge of solar lanterns, perception about their benefit, estimated market
price, etc. Our results suggest that learning how to operate the technology and observing its benefits, which
appeared to be superior to the kerosene lamp that households in the study area use as a source of lighting,
are the important factors that drive WTP of both treatment groups.
Our findings have significant implications for policies that aim at promoting adoption and diffusion of
new technologies in developing countries. If rewarding information communicator peers promotes information
spill-over and willingness to pay, this implies that reducing the cost of the technology and allocating resources
to communication will have significant welfare impacts on society. The results also highlight the potential role
solar technologies could play in electrification. A significant proportion of households in developing countries
do not have access to electricity and governments lack the required resources to extend the grid. Solar
power has a large potential to tackle energy poverty by serving as a decentralized solution. In this regard,
identifying the impact of incentivizing communication in inducing adoption and diffusion of such low-cost
and environmentally-friendly technologies in rural settings provides useful information to policymakers and
stakeholders who aim at improving the living conditions of poor households while protecting the environment.
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Figure 1: Histogram of bids for the solar lantern. Summary statistics are as follows: minimum = 0; maximum
= 1200; mean = 239; standard deviation = 266.
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Figure 2: Map of study area around Gonda City. The green dots indicate the study habitations.
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Figure 3: Timeline of the experiment.
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Figure 4: Faceted histogram of bids for the solar lantern.
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Figure 5: Boxplots of bids for the solar lantern.
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Total number of habitations
Control Network Communication
Male Seed 98 98 98
Female Seed 99 99 99
Table 1: Size of treatment groups. In all treatments, the sample household’s head is interviewed. The gender
treatment is randomized across habitations; the information treatment is randomized within habitations.
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Cont Net DIFF Cont Comm DIFF Net Comm DIFF
1) Individual Characteristics:
Female respondent 0.355 0.198 0.157∗∗∗ 0.355 0.254 0.102∗∗ 0.198 0.254 -0.0558
(0.480) (0.399) (3.54) (0.480) (0.436) (2.20) (0.399) (0.436) (-1.32)
Year of birth 1972.1 1971.8 0.239 1972.1 1970.7 1.345 1971.8 1970.7 1.107
(14.76) (14.24) (0.16) (14.76) (12.91) (0.96) (14.24) (12.91) (0.81)
Education 1.944 2.041 -0.0964 1.944 1.893 0.0508 2.041 1.893 0.147
(1.352) (1.435) (-0.69) (1.352) (1.255) (0.39) (1.435) (1.255) (1.08)
Reads Hindi 0.477 0.487 -0.0102 0.477 0.482 -0.00508 0.487 0.482 0.00508
(0.501) (0.501) (-0.20) (0.501) (0.501) (-0.10) (0.501) (0.501) (0.10)
2) Household Characteristics:
Number of children 3.693 3.918 -0.225 3.693 4.015 -0.323 3.918 4.015 -0.0979
(2.106) (2.032) (-1.07) (2.106) (2.085) (-1.51) (2.032) (2.085) (-0.47)
Number of children in school 1.370 1.412 -0.0426 1.370 1.649 -0.280∗ 1.412 1.649 -0.237
(1.550) (1.562) (-0.27) (1.550) (1.657) (-1.71) (1.562) (1.657) (-1.45)
Household size 7.310 7.183 0.127 7.310 7.289 0.0203 7.183 7.289 -0.107
(3.916) (3.379) (0.34) (3.916) (3.375) (0.06) (3.379) (3.375) (-0.31)
3) Wealth-related variables:
Monthly Expenses 4176.6 4376.6 -200 4176.6 4530.5 -353.8 4376.6 4530.5 -153.8
(2334.3) (3412.5) (-0.68) (2334.3) (2810.7) (-1.36) (3412.5) (2810.7) (-0.49)
Amount of Savings 223.4 682.2 -458.9∗∗∗ 223.4 661.4 -438.1∗∗∗ 682.2 661.4 20.81
(673.8) (884.1) (-5.79) (673.8) (1038.3) (-4.97) (884.1) (1038.3) (0.21)
In debt 0.467 0.609 -0.142∗∗∗ 0.467 0.477 -0.0102 0.609 0.477 0.132∗∗∗
(0.500) (0.489) (-2.85) (0.500) (0.501) (-0.20) (0.489) (0.501) (2.65)
Owns a business 0.0355 0.0660 -0.0305 0.0355 0.0711 -0.0355 0.0660 0.0711 -0.00508
(0.186) (0.249) (-1.38) (0.186) (0.258) (-1.57) (0.249) (0.258) (-0.20)
Amount of land (acres) 1.310 1.443 -0.134 1.310 1.415 -0.106 1.443 1.415 0.0278
(1.888) (1.936) (-0.69) (1.888) (1.426) (-0.63) (1.936) (1.426) (0.16)
Owns cattle 0.873 0.873 0 0.873 0.929 -0.0558∗ 0.873 0.929 -0.0558∗
(0.334) (0.334) (0.00) (0.334) (0.258) (-1.86) (0.334) (0.258) (-1.86)
Owns a phone 0.853 0.838 0.0152 0.853 0.868 -0.0152 0.838 0.868 -0.0305
(0.355) (0.370) (0.42) (0.355) (0.339) (-0.44) (0.370) (0.339) (-0.85)
4) Lighting-related variables:
Number of kerosene lamps 2.376 2.421 -0.0457 2.376 2.401 -0.0254 2.421 2.401 0.0203
(1.266) (1.229) (-0.36) (1.266) (1.043) (-0.22) (1.229) (1.043) (0.18)
Hours of lighting 5.178 4.782 0.396∗ 5.178 5.033 0.145 4.782 5.033 -0.251
(2.368) (1.814) (1.86) (2.368) (1.766) (0.69) (1.814) (1.766) (-1.39)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2: Balance table across treatments and associated t-tests. A rank-sum test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney)
was also performed for the variables that do not approximate a normal distribution. The only difference with
the t-tests are as follows: 1) The difference between control and communication for the number of children
that go to school is significant at the 10% level, 2) The difference between network and communication for
hours of lighting is now significant at the 10% level.
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Cont M Cont F DIFF Net M Net F DIFF Comm M Comm F DIFF
1) Individual Characteristics:
Female respondent 0.153 0.556 -0.402∗∗∗ 0.102 0.293 -0.191∗∗∗ 0.153 0.354 -0.200∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.499) (-6.47) (0.304) (0.457) (-3.45) (0.362) (0.480) (-3.31)
Year of birth 1971.3 1972.8 1.532 1971.6 1972.1 -0.529 1969.7 1971.8 -2.043
(15.89) (13.58) (-0.73) (15.06) (13.44) (-0.26) (12.82) (12.97) (-1.11)
Education 2.051 1.838 .213 2.265 1.818 0.447∗∗ 1.980 1.808 0.172
(1.357) (1.345) (1.10) (1.544) (1.289) (2.21) (1.284) (1.226) (0.96)
Reads Hindi 0.541 0.414 0.127∗ 0.592 0.384 0.208∗∗∗ 0.490 0.475 0.0150
(0.501) (0.495) (1.79) (0.494) (0.489) (2.97) (0.502) (0.502) (0.21)
2) Household Characteristics:
Number of children 3.543 3.837 -0.294 3.823 4.010 -0.187 3.918 4.113 -0.196
(2.077) (2.133) (-0.97) (2.026) (2.043) (-0.64) (2.045) (2.131) (-0.65)
Number of children in school 1.223 1.510 -0.287 1.417 1.408 0.00850 1.526 1.773 -0.247
(1.489) (1.601) (-1.28) (1.499) (1.630) (0.04) (1.690) (1.623) (-1.04)
Household size 7.357 7.263 0.0945 7.765 6.606 1.159∗∗ 7.939 6.646 1.292∗∗∗
(3.946) (3.906) (0.17) (3.705) (2.927) (2.44) (3.472) (3.163) (2.73)
3) Wealth-related variables:
Monthly Expenses 3899.0 4451.5 -552.5∗ 4844.9 3913.1 931.8∗ 4940.8 4124.2 816.6∗∗
(2240.9) (2403.0) (-1.67) (4403.4) (1913.7) (1.93) (3206.4) (2299.6) (2.06)
Amount of Savings 278.6 168.7 109.9 717.3 647.5 69.87 672.4 650.5 21.94
(776.2) (552.7) (1.15) (914.5) (856.1) (0.55) (740.3) (1270.3) (0.15)
In debt 0.480 0.455 0.0250 0.582 0.636 -0.0547 0.480 0.475 0.00484
(0.502) (0.500) (0.35) (0.496) (0.483) (-0.78) (0.502) (0.502) (0.07)
Owns a business 0.0510 0.0202 0.0308 0.0816 0.0505 0.0311 0.0612 0.0808 -0.0196
(0.221) (0.141) (1.17) (0.275) (0.220) (0.88) (0.241) (0.274) (-0.53)
Amount of land (acres) 1.196 1.422 -0.226 1.431 1.455 -0.0248 1.604 1.228 0.375∗
(1.157) (2.404) (-0.84) (1.678) (2.170) (-0.09) (1.638) (1.158) (1.86)
Owns cattle 0.827 0.919 -0.0927∗ 0.867 0.879 -0.0114 0.918 0.939 -0.0210
(0.381) (0.274) (-1.96) (0.341) (0.328) (-0.24) (0.275) (0.240) (-0.57)
Owns a phone 0.816 0.889 -0.0726 0.806 0.869 -0.0626 0.908 0.828 0.0799∗
(0.389) (0.316) (-1.44) (0.397) (0.339) (-1.19) (0.290) (0.379) (1.66)
4) Lighting-related variables:
Number of kerosene lamps 2.235 2.515 -0.280 2.439 2.404 0.0347 2.541 2.263 0.278∗
(1.250) (1.273) (-1.56) (1.332) (1.124) (0.20) (1.141) (0.921) (1.88)
Hours of lighting 5.082 5.273 -0.191 4.806 4.758 0.0485 5.005 5.061 -0.0555
(2.218) (2.515) (-0.57) (1.892) (1.743) (0.19) (1.709) (1.828) (-0.22)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3: Balance table across treatments and seed gender and associated t-tests. A rank-sum test (Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney) was also performed for the variables that do not approximate a normal distribution. The
only difference with the t tests are as follows: 1) The difference in education level is significant at 10% in
the control group, 2) The difference in household expenses is not significant in the network group, 3) The
difference in savings of the seeds is significant at 10% in the communication group, 4) The difference in
irrigated land is not significant in the communication group, 5) The difference in the number of kerosene
lamps is not significant in the communication group.34
Control Network Communication
WTP - All seeds 133.5 254.9 330.2
(180.6) (267.0) (300.4)
WTP - Male Seed 107.1 245.4 334.2
(141.6) (278.9) (308.1)
WTP - Female Seed 159.6 264.4 326.3
(209.8) (255.8) (294.5)
Variable: Willingness to Pay. Means and standard deviations.
Table 4: Means across treatments.
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Differences
Control - Network Control - Communication Network - Communication
WTP - All seeds -121.4∗∗∗ -196.7∗∗∗ -75.26∗∗∗
(-5.27) (-7.86) (-2.61)
WTP - Male Seed -138.2∗∗∗ -227.1∗∗∗ -88.85∗∗
(-4.37) (-6.61) (-2.10)
WTP - Female Seed -104.8∗∗∗ -166.7∗∗∗ -61.83
(-3.14) (-4.59) (-1.57)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5: Tests for means across treatments. Chi-square tests for whether the mean WTP is the same in all
treatment groups always yield that the three coefficients are different at the 1% level in the whole sample
as well as in the subsample of female seeds and the subsample of male seeds. Rank-sum tests were also
performed for each of the t-tests and p-values were found identical. The χ2 test statistic for identical mean
WTP across treatment groups is 94.17; with 34 degrees of freedom, the associated p-value equals 0. The χ2
test statistic for the WTP to be equal in all treatment groups within the subsample of male seed is 60.99;
with 30 degrees of freedom, the associated p-value equals 0.001. The χ2 test statistic for the WTP to be
equal in all treatment groups within the subsample of female seed is 55.69; with 32 degrees of freedom, the
associated p-value equals 0.006. The z statistics for the rank-sum tests are as follows. First row: -5.5; -7.9;
-2.8. Second row: -4.2; -6.2; -2.4. Third row: -3.6; -5.0; -1.5.
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Differences
Male - Female
WTP - Control -52.45∗∗
(-2.05)
WTP - Network -19.07
(-0.50)
WTP - Communication 7.948
(0.18)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6: Tests for means across seed gender. Rank-sum tests are as follows. Control group: z = -1.463, Prob
> |z| = 0.1435. Network: z =-0.876, Prob > |z| = 0.3811. Communication: z = 0.166, Prob > |z| = 0.8682.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
WTP WTP WTP WTP
Network 119.883∗∗∗ 116.383∗∗∗ 136.988∗∗∗
(22.115) (30.297) (30.847)
Communication 195.078∗∗∗ 204.785∗∗∗ 224.416∗∗∗
(22.925) (32.325) (32.086)
Seed Gender 22.241
(24.674)
Network x Female Seed 9.080 -34.067
(38.292) (44.229)
Communication x Female Seed -16.890 -57.749
(42.631) (45.745)
Habitation fixed effects Yes No No Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.157 0.002 0.161
Observations 585 585 585 585
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 7: Main results for experimental treatments. In column 1, the coefficients for Network and Commu-
nication are different at the 1% level.
38
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Network 107.560∗∗∗ 114.829∗∗∗ 103.161∗∗∗ 119.744∗∗∗ 117.944∗∗∗
(22.727) (28.718) (25.966) (33.841) (36.070)
Communication 183.525∗∗∗ 201.240∗∗∗ 177.301∗∗∗ 229.662∗∗∗ 214.382∗∗∗
(23.902) (25.510) (27.383) (39.679) (43.535)
Amount of Savings 0.026∗∗ 0.066∗∗
(0.013) (0.033)
Network x Savings -0.037
(0.039)
Communication x Savings -0.053∗
(0.031)
Savings (log) 5.689 19.353∗∗
(4.340) (7.478)
Network x log Savings -14.007
(8.860)
Communication x log Savings -22.412∗∗
(9.470)
Habitation fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.165 0.170 0.162 0.173 0.180
Observations 585 585 585 585 315
Standard errors in parentheses
Model57 is for the sub-sample of respondents that declare zero savings.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 8: Main results for experimental treatments controlling for amount of savings. We also tested a
specification with logarithmic savings, but the coefficient on savings was found insignificant (p-value=0.19).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Network 115.107∗∗∗ 103.683∗∗∗ 388.290∗∗ 107.520∗∗∗
(22.469) (22.937) (180.316) (23.925)
Communication 191.915∗∗∗ 181.072∗∗∗ 470.514∗∗∗ 180.476∗∗∗
(23.112) (24.064) (180.690) (25.348)
Female Head -31.046 -27.911 -29.942 -23.510
(27.096) (26.594) (26.485) (29.275)
Amount of Savings 0.026∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.025∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Interview date -7.698
(4.800)
Education 4.459
(11.716)
Monthly Expenses -0.005
(0.005)
In debt -26.115
(26.128)
Household size -2.565
(3.855)
Number of children to school 11.893
(7.433)
Number of kerosene lamps 19.780∗
(11.547)
Hours of lighting 1.415
(6.504)
Habitation fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.160 0.167 0.176 0.181
Observations 585 585 584 574
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 9: Main results for experimental treatments with control variables included.
40
Cont. Net. DIFF Cont. Comm. DIFF Net. Comm. DIFF
Seen lantern before 0.244 0.934 -0.690∗∗∗ 0.244 0.949 -0.706∗∗∗ 0.934 0.949 -0.0152
(0.430) (0.249) (-19.49) (0.430) (0.220) (-20.49) (0.249) (0.220) (-0.64)
Know someone with lantern 0.132 0.924 -0.792∗∗∗ 0.132 0.944 -0.812∗∗∗ 0.924 0.944 -0.0203
(0.339) (0.266) (-25.78) (0.339) (0.230) (-27.80) (0.266) (0.230) (-0.81)
Can function properly 0.533 0.0508 0.482∗∗∗ 0.533 0.0914 0.442∗∗∗ 0.0508 0.0914 -0.0406
(0.500) (0.220) (12.39) (0.500) (0.289) (10.73) (0.220) (0.289) (-1.57)
Cost estimate 627.1 838.7 -211.6∗∗∗ 627.1 736.6 -109.5∗∗ 838.7 736.6 102.1∗
(558.7) (647.9) (-3.47) (558.7) (538.9) (-1.98) (647.9) (538.9) (1.70)
Innovative product 4.939 4.980 -0.0405 4.939 4.970 -0.0305 4.980 4.970 0.0100
(0.373) (0.226) (-1.30) (0.373) (0.200) (-1.01) (0.226) (0.200) (0.47)
Superior to kerosene lamps 4.995 4.980 0.0152 4.995 4.985 0.0101 4.980 4.985 -0.00508
(0.0714) (0.174) (1.13) (0.0714) (0.123) (1.00) (0.174) (0.123) (-0.33)
Will recommend to others 4.995 4.975 0.0203 4.995 4.949 0.0457∗ 4.975 4.949 0.0254
(0.0712) (0.187) (1.42) (0.0712) (0.346) (1.81) (0.187) (0.346) (0.91)
Table 10: Summary statistics for some key solar lantern related variables highlighting possible mechanisms.
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(1) (2)
Estimated cost Estimated cost
WTP 0.390∗∗∗
(0.091)
Network 211.589∗∗∗
(53.725)
Communication 109.538∗∗
(53.985)
Habitation fixed effects No Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes
R-squared 0.031 0.036
Observations 585 591
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 11: Results with cost estimate of solar lanterns as dependent variable.
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Male Seeds Female Seeds Difference
Born in village 0.970 0.140 0.830∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.349) (11.78)
Number of children 3.714 4.530 -0.816∗∗
(2.021) (2.418) (-2.11)
Education 2.090 1.480 0.610∗∗∗
(1.296) (0.990) (3.86)
Education of spouse 1.265 2.360 -1.095∗∗∗
(0.807) (1.345) (-7.10)
Reads Hindi 0.530 0.310 0.220∗∗∗
(0.502) (0.465) (3.15)
Amount of savings 387 228 159∗∗
(1197.5) (1076.1) (2.18)
Children use lighting for studying 0.560 0.700 -0.140∗∗
(0.499) (0.461) (-2.05)
Current lighting bad 4.175 4.544 -0.369∗∗
(1.315) (0.876) (-1.77)
Mostly be using: myself 0.490 0.700 -0.210∗∗∗
(0.502) (0.461) (-3.02)
Mostly be using: my spouse 0.300 0.0500 0.250∗∗∗
(0.461) (0.219) (4.64)
Discuss how to spend money 1.600 -0.180∗∗
(0.684) (0.603) (-1.96)
Women should work outside 3.690 4.470 -0.780∗∗∗
(1.733) (1.132) (-3.10)
Participation in village meetings 0.280 0.140 0.140∗∗
(0.570) (0.377) (1.77)
Participation in farmers’ cooperative meetings 0.140 0.0200 0.120∗∗∗
(0.377) (0.200) (3.28)
Participation in religious group events 1.050 0.800 0.250∗∗
(0.702) (0.739) (2.46)
Participation in political events 0.370 0.100 0.270∗∗∗
(0.630) (0.333) (3.66)
Trust other villagers 3.830 3.280 0.550∗∗
(1.436) (1.694) (2.14)
Spend time with friends (dummy) 0.380 0.240 0.140∗∗
(0.488) (0.429) (2.14)
Number of friends 10.02 6.390 3.630∗∗∗
(11.52) (4.722) (3.05)
Table 12: Summary statistics for the two seed groups (male and female), with the corresponding z statistics
of the rank-sum test. Only variables with significant differences are reported.
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Male Seed Friends Female Seed Friends Difference
Female respondent 0.136 0.401 -0.265∗∗∗
(0.343) (0.491) (-7.25)
Education 2.099 1.822 0.277∗∗∗
(1.400) (1.283) (2.95)
Reads Hindi 0.541 0.424 0.117∗∗∗
(0.499) (0.495) (2.83)
Amount of savings 556.1 488.9 67.23∗∗
(834.7) (964.1) (2.12)
Household size 7.687 6.838 0.849∗∗∗
(3.708) (3.360) (2.90)
Can function properly 0.255 0.195 0.0598∗
(0.437) (0.397) (1.74)
Would feel safer if more light 4.990 4.959 0.0303∗
(0.130) (0.270) (1.90)
Was victim of kerosene fire 0.184 0.108 0.0759∗∗∗
(0.388) (0.311) (2.62)
Knows a victim of a kerosene fire 0.323 0.249 0.0740∗∗
(0.468) (0.433) (1.99)
Mostly be using: myself 0.257 0.332 -0.0755∗∗
(0.438) (0.472) (-2.02)
Mostly be using: spouse 0.436 0.322 0.114∗∗∗
(0.497) (0.468) (2.85)
Table 13: Social network analysis: characteristics of the friends chosen by the male seeds and the female
seeds, with the corresponding z-statistics of the rank-sum test. Only variables with significant differences
are reported.
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Male Female Difference
Year of birth 1970.1 1975.5 -5.414∗∗∗
(14.74) (10.73) (-4.24)
Number of children 3.787 4.114 -0.327∗
(2.086) (2.032) (-1.69)
Education 2.194 1.321 0.874∗∗∗
(1.411) (0.895) (7.29)
Expenses 4384.3 4298.7 85.52
(3073.8) (2303.3) (0.32)
Savings 574.8 379.9 194.9∗∗
(965.0) (684.9) (2.34)
Owns a business 0.0741 0.0126 0.0615∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.112) (2.86)
Household size 7.449 6.748 0.701∗∗
(3.578) (3.471) (2.13)
Number of children to school 1.410 1.658 -0.248∗
(1.616) (1.518) (-1.67)
Read hindi 0.590 0.189 0.402∗∗∗
(0.492) (0.392) (9.26)
In debt 0.514 0.528 -0.0144
(0.500) (0.501) (-0.31)
Land 1.456 1.207 0.249
(1.668) (1.993) (1.53)
Irrigated land 1.406 1.158 0.247
(1.603) (1.981) (1.56)
Owns cattle 0.903 0.862 0.0411
(0.297) (0.346) (1.43)
Has a phone 0.856 0.843 0.0137
(0.351) (0.365) (0.42)
Number of kerosene lamps 2.451 2.258 0.194∗
(1.189) (1.154) (1.77)
Hours of lighting 4.906 5.245 -0.339∗
(1.884) (2.288) (-1.83)
Table 14: Summary statistics by gender of respondent. 159 observations for female and 432 for male.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Male Female All Male Female
Network 119.883∗∗∗ 132.505∗∗∗ 131.282∗ 136.988∗∗∗ 134.586∗∗∗ 183.333
(22.115) (28.906) (72.932) (30.847) (35.014) (205.317)
Communication 195.078∗∗∗ 201.245∗∗∗ 173.572∗∗∗ 224.416∗∗∗ 224.802∗∗∗ -58.333
(22.925) (30.216) (64.552) (32.086) (36.442) (207.667)
Network x Female Seed -34.067 -10.586 -74.003
(44.229) (62.968) (216.857)
Communication x Female Seed -57.749 -63.893 261.340
(45.745) (65.971) (217.925)
Habitation fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.157 0.161 0.144 0.161 0.165 0.191
Observations 585 426 159 585 426 159
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Willingness to Pay.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 15: Heterogeneity analysis by gender of the respondent.
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Control Network Communication
1. Should ask permission to go the health center 0.975 0.959 0.954
(0.158) (0.198) (0.209)
2. Should ask permission to go visit a friend 0.995 0.949 0.985
(0.0712) (0.220) (0.123)
3. Should ask permission to go to the market 0.990 0.964 0.990
(0.101) (0.186) (0.101)
4. Talk with spouse about what to spend money on 1.660 1.645 1.492
(0.545) (0.576) (0.636)
5. Women should have a say on how to spend income 0.995 0.990 0.929
(0.124) (0.101) (0.277)
6. It is important that girls go to school 4.985 4.980 4.959
(0.214) (0.141) (0.222)
7. Women should work outside home or own a business 4.223 3.086 3.685
(1.415) (1.786) (1.756)
8. Beating justified if she goes out without telling 0.594 0.497 0.497
(0.492) (0.501) (0.501)
9. Beating justified if she argues with husband 0.589 0.624 0.680
(0.493) (0.486) (0.468)
10. Beating justified if suspected of adultery 0.706 0.741 0.822
(0.457) (0.439) (0.383)
11. Men are better able to use new technologies than women 3.452 3.264 2.924
(1.712) (1.657) (1.738)
Table 16: Descriptive statistics on women’s status. Note: Most variables are binary variables where 0 codes
for no, and 1 for yes. Answers to question 4 are coded as follows: 0 for “Never”, 1 for “Sometimes”, 2 for
“Often”. Answers to questions 6, 7, and 11 are as follows: 1 for “Definitely not”, 2 for “Not really”, 3 for
“Neutral”, 4 for “Somewhat” and 5 for “Definitely”.
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